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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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Results for homeland security (u.s.)
9 results foundAuthor: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11 Summary: The events of September 11, 2001, led to profound changes in government policies and structures to confront homeland security threats. Most notably, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) began operations in 2003 with key missions that included preventing terrorist attacks from occurring in the United States, and minimizing the damages from any attacks that may occur. DHS is now the third-largest federal department, with more than 200,000 employees and an annual budget of more than $50 billion. Since 2003, GAO has issued over 1,000 products on DHS's operations in such areas as border and transportation security and emergency management, among others. As requested, this report addresses DHS's progress in implementing its homeland security missions since it began operations, work remaining, and issues affecting implementation efforts. This report is based on GAO's past and ongoing work, supplemented with DHS Office of Inspector General reports, with an emphasis on reports issued since 2008. GAO also analyzed information provided by DHS in July and August 2011 on recent actions taken in response to prior work. Since it began operations in 2003, DHS has implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important goals and milestones in many areas to create and strengthen a foundation to reach its potential. As it continues to mature, however, more work remains for DHS to address gaps and weaknesses in its current operational and implementation efforts, and to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of those efforts to achieve its full potential. DHS's accomplishments include developing strategic and operational plans; deploying workforces; and establishing new, or expanding existing, offices and programs. For example, DHS (1) issued plans to guide its efforts, such as the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, which provides a framework for homeland security, and the National Response Framework, which outlines disaster response guiding principles; (2) successfully hired, trained, and deployed workforces, such as a federal screening workforce to assume security screening responsibilities at airports nationwide; and (3) created new programs and offices to implement its homeland security responsibilities, such as establishing the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team to help coordinate efforts to address cybersecurity threats. Such accomplishments are noteworthy given that DHS has had to work to transform itself into a fully functioning department while implementing its missions--a difficult undertaking that can take years to achieve. While DHS has made progress, its transformation remains high risk due to its management challenges. Examples of progress made and work remaining include: Border security. DHS implemented the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program to verify the identities of foreign visitors entering and exiting the country by processing biometric and biographic information. However, DHS has not yet determined how to implement a biometric exit capability and has taken action to address a small portion of the estimated overstay population in the United States (individuals who legally entered the country but then overstayed their authorized periods of admission). Aviation security. DHS developed and implemented Secure Flight, a program for screening airline passengers against terrorist watchlist records. DHS also developed new programs and technologies to screen passengers, checked baggage, and air cargo. However, DHS does not yet have a plan for deploying checked baggage screening technologies to meet recently enhanced explosive detection requirements, a mechanism to verify the accuracy of data to help ensure that air cargo screening is being conducted at reported levels, or approved technology to screen cargo once it is loaded onto a pallet or container. Emergency preparedness and response. DHS issued the National Preparedness Guidelines that describe a national framework for capabilities-based preparedness, and a Target Capabilities List to provide a national-level generic model of capabilities defining all-hazards preparedness. DHS is also finalizing a National Disaster Recovery Framework, and awards preparedness grants based on a reasonable risk methodology. However, DHS needs to strengthen its efforts to assess capabilities for all-hazards preparedness, and develop a long-term recovery structure to better align timing and involvement with state and local governments' capacity. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats. DHS assessed risks posed by CBRN threats and deployed capabilities to detect CBRN threats. However, DHS should work to improve its coordination of CBRN risk assessments, and identify monitoring mechanisms for determining progress made in implementing the global nuclear detection strategy. GAO's work identified three themes at the foundation of DHS's challenges. This report contains no new recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2011. 225p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-11-881: Accessed September 12, 2011 at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11881.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11881.pdf Shelf Number: 122718 Keywords: Aviation SecurityCounter-TerrorismCyber SecurityHomeland Security (U.S.)ImmigrationMaritime SecurityRisk ManagementTerrorismTransportation Security |
Author: Service Employees International Union Title: Homeland Insecurity: How the Wackenhut Corporation Is Compromising America's Nuclear Security Summary: Despite the high level of public concern over homeland security, the single largest supplier of security officers to sensitive U.S. nuclear facilities is a private firm that has overseen frightening security lapses, presided over training cutbacks, and tolerated lax security measures at multiple nuclear sites throughout the United States. The firm? The Wackenhut Corporation, a subsidiary of the Denmark-based, multi-national private security conglomerate Group 4 Falck A/S. Wackenhut, the single largest supplier of private contract security officers to U.S. nuclear power plants and nuclear weapons facilities, provides security and other services at thirty nuclear power plants and seven U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) sites, including the U.S. Government’s principal nuclear weapons labs. While many of the individual nuclear security lapses and problems that have occurred under Wackenhut’s watch have been reported in the media or made available in public documents, there has not been, to date, a public focus on the fact that what many of these problem sites have in common is that Wackenhut provides their security. Furthermore, the U.S. Government or nuclear security watchdogs have not conducted or made public a comprehensive investigation to date into Wackenhut’s security practices at all its nuclear sites in the U.S. This report, “Homeland Insecurity: How The Wackenhut Corporation Is Compromising America’s Nuclear Security,” is the result of the first-ever comprehensive study of public documents, reports, news stories, and court filings related to nuclear security by America’s largest union of private security officers, SEIU (Service Employees International Union). The documents find the Wackenhut Corporation at the center of the swirling controversy over our nation’s nuclear security readiness and raise questions about the private firm’s fitness to provide adequate security at our nation’s most sensitive sites. Details: Washington, DC: SEIU International, 2004. 24p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 27, 2011 at: http://seiu23.advocateoffice.com/vertical/Sites/%7B2FDAD06E-E7D3-4DE0-AEF2-0C787424C292%7D/uploads/%7B49FFC6A0-FECC-4DD5-A67B-20DEE438E2F3%7D.PDF Year: 2004 Country: United States URL: http://seiu23.advocateoffice.com/vertical/Sites/%7B2FDAD06E-E7D3-4DE0-AEF2-0C787424C292%7D/uploads/%7B49FFC6A0-FECC-4DD5-A67B-20DEE438E2F3%7D.PDF Shelf Number: 122913 Keywords: Homeland Security (U.S.)Nuclear TerrorismPrivate SecurityTerrorism |
Author: U.S. Department of Homeland Security Title: Risk Management Fundamentals Homeland Security Risk Management Doctrine Summary: This doctrine, Risk Management Fundamentals, serves as an authoritative statement regarding the principles and process of homeland security risk management and what they mean to homeland security planning and execution. It is intended as the capstone doctrine on risk management for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Furthermore, Risk Management Fundamentals serves as a foundational document supporting DHS risk management efforts in partnership with the homeland security enterprise. Risk Management Fundamentals is intended to help homeland security leaders, supporting staffs, program managers, analysts, and operational personnel develop a framework to make risk management an integral part of planning, preparing, and executing organizational missions. The development of homeland security risk management doctrine is an essential element in promoting a risk-informed culture enabling training, capability development, and integration across DHS to strengthen and improve the Nation’s security. Risk Management Fundamentals articulates a desired end-state that DHS aspires to achieve in promoting risk management. This doctrine is not a substitute for independent thought or innovation in applying these principles and concepts. Simply reading the doctrine will not make one adept in managing risks, nor will attempting to follow the ideas herein as if they were a checklist; rather, doctrine serves to shape how one thinks about the issues that you are considering and should be applied based on the operating environment. Homeland security practitioners should compare the doctrine herein against their own experience and think about why, when, and how it applies to their situation and area of responsibility. The purpose of this document is to: Promote a common understanding of, and approach to, risk management; Establish organizational practices that should be followed by DHS Components; Provide a foundation for conducting risk assessments and evaluating risk management options; Set the doctrinal underpinning for institutionalizing a risk management culture through consistent application and training on risk management principles and practices; and Educate and inform homeland security stakeholders in risk management applications, including the assessment of capability, program, and operational performance, and the use of such assessments for resource and policy decisions. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2011. 31p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed November 5, 2011 at: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-risk-management-fundamentals.pdf Year: 2011 Country: United States URL: http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-risk-management-fundamentals.pdf Shelf Number: 123245 Keywords: Homeland Security (U.S.)Risk AssessmentRisk ManagementTerrorism |
Author: The NYU Review of Law and Security Title: Are We Safer? In New York City? In our states? In the country at large? Summary: Strolling down the street, sitting in traffic, listening to campaign slogans, one hears the question daily: “Are We Safer?” Whether we want to or not, we cannot help but bend our ear in the direction of the voice that promises an answer. Rarely is the answer firm or reassuring. Always, it seems these days to be partisan or driven by political concerns. “Yes, we are safer,” the Republicans tell us, except when they want to encourage fear as a basis of support for continuity in the White House or for the war in Iraq. “No,” the Democrats tell us, figuring the image of the Republicans as insufficient protectors cannot but help the Democrats in the coming election. Citizens line up accordingly. But the question of the nation’s safety is only partly a matter of conjecture; it is also a matter of fact. Since September 11, the country has taken numerous steps legislatively, judicially, militarily and in the Oval Office to ameliorate weaknesses in our security system. Some of these measures have proven effective, some have not. Policymakers continue to scrutinize the efficacy of our border control, our information gathering and other counterterrorism measures in the hopes of assessing these measures. But in the heated political atmosphere, the conclusions on both sides have become suspect. The relationship between safety and the legitimacy of authoritative analysis is not something to be overlooked. The respect for language is a sign of the authenticity of the relationship between citizen and state. It is, in that sense, fundamental to a functioning democracy. Education, as envisioned by Jefferson and the founding fathers, was first and foremost education of the citizen and at the heart of that education was the proper and learned use of language. In the context of American society, religious doctrine reinforces in theory the sanctity of impeccably used language. If language is an inviolable basis of the social (and personal) contract, it is also the first tool in the battle for power. As language goes, so goes politics. George Orwell insisted that there is a direct correlation between the integrity of politics and the honesty with which those in power use language. So, too, for the obverse. “Corrupt language leads to corrupt politics.” Consider, in this context, the use of language by President George W. Bush and his administration. On the one hand, we have the President who displays a disregard for the word so much so that it has become a trademark of sorts. “Nucular,” not nuclear, “subliminable” not subliminal, “embetter” not improve, “resignate,” instead of resonate. More, he relishes the colloquial, in his case, the slang of American Westerns. When it comes to Osama, his goal is to “Smoke ‘em out,” and when it comes to the insurgents in Iraq, he dares, “Bring ‘em on.” But while George Bush downplays language as something to respect and pay too much attention to, his administration is busy lobbing terms of great import at the American public. In the battle for the hearts and minds of Americans, Bush’s circle of advisors has created a lexicon of terms aimed at persuading the American mind with the word itself. The terminology which labels the multiplicity of changes on behalf of national security and the war on terror are full of examples: Homeland Security, the Patriot Act, and the Citizens Corps. Not to mention the use of value statements as strategic euphemisms designed to quell further thought, as if to say that he who first labels the situation, wins the battle of interpretation. Take, for example, the word ‘coalition,’ which in reality consists of U.S. troops with comparably negligible troops from England and a few small countries; or the statement that the U.S. is “bringing democracy and freedom” to the Middle East. This use of words as “euphemism, question begging and sheer cloudy vagueness,” Orwell’s description of politically slanted speech, is a basic technique of language misconstrued for political ends: “liberation” instead of occupation, “military justice” instead of incommunicado detention, “unlawful combatant” instead of prisoner of war, “collateral damage” instead of civilian deaths, “enabling interrogation” instead of torture, and so on. American policymakers are eminently aware of the firepower of linguistic ammunition and of the importance of George W. Bush seeming like a confused, lost communicator. It is part of the process of spinning the nation. If Orwell were around, he might want, in the case of President Bush and his entourage, to add a new category for the current state of affairs: posing. How could someone as clueless and full of human foibles have an evil plan? He’s just a regular guy, with a regular guy’s language. What he says must be right. It’s just down-home, simple fact. Criticism of the government is treason, lack of support for the President is a lack of support for the troops, spending American lives and money abroad at the rate of 20 million dollars a day is patriotism and love of country. Yet in contradistinction to the signs of verbal laxity on the part of Bush, the careful selection of words, coordinated at the executive level, to launch the war in Iraq and by extension the war on terror at home, has been a strong and unflagging tactic of the Bush Administration as they have tackled the Axis of Evil and the possibility of unknown terrorists among us. They understand, as the political philosopher Hannah Arendt once wrote that the misuse of facts, the use of “deliberate falsehood,” is “clearly an attempt to change the record, and as such, it is a form of action.” Powell’s insistence before the U.N. that there was “evidence, not conjecture” of WMD’s in Iraq, and that his facts were “true” and “well-documented” has turned into the admission that there did not seem to be weapons of mass destruction. The public denial of any knowledge of torture practices and the subsequent release of documents sanctioning torture would be another case of the use of misinformation as action. The duplicity was intensified by the attack on those who questioned the initial assertions of the government. Rumsfeld, members of Congress and others attacked the media for “hurting our chances,” by “dwelling upon the mistakes, the ambushes, the soldiers killed, the wounded,” rather than the signs of progress. And what of the Democrats? It seems they have lost their dictionaries and have ceded to the Republicans the role of wordsmiths, as if one of the perks of power is the right to control language. One can only assume either that they agree with the Republicans on some level, or that they are scared. The Republicans, they know, will label their words propagandistic and they want to avoid that, it seems, at all costs. But what about taking an oath to use language simply as it is used in the dictionary? Killing is killing, whether it is by a terrorist or an American soldier. From that, they could graduate to facts. The numbers of dollars spent and Americans killed is not an abstraction; it is not a matter of debate. It is a fact. As is the relationship between the Saudis and the Bush family, whether harmful or benign. And so on. The press has not always been helpful. They have helped spread the factual errors of the Bush Administration by refusing to fact-check, as if unwilling to put themselves in the position of pointing to errors of fact. There was no yellow cake uranium sent to Niger. There were no weapons of mass destruction. There was little to no chance that the oil in Iraq would be able to be sold on the market until after a complete rehaul costing vast sums of time and money reengineered them for producing crude oil. The fact is that Democrats and Republicans alike have ceded to the Bush Administration’s unspoken conviction that all words, all use of facts are ideology. In this, there is tremendous victory. No words are valuable; no facts, it seems, are without spin. Everything, it is agreed, is opinion. How do we find a language of honesty? Vaclav Havel had some advice. The first premise is to look at the facts. The U.S. invaded Iraq, for example. For what reasons it did so is interpretation. What we should do now is a matter of conjecture. And so on. If we start with the facts and keep listing facts, self-consciously and with restraint, perhaps we will eventually have a firmer, less ideological ground upon which to make judgments. “Conceptually we may call truth what we cannot change. Metaphorically, it is the ground on which we stand and the sky that stretches above us,” wrote Hannah Arendt. This issue represents an attempt to look at the facts as stepping stones to grounded conclusions, or at least as windows of information rather than opinion for inclusion in our store of opinions. We have included the debates on the safety of the country, on the Patriot Act and on Homeland Security but we have tried to present these within the context of knowledge about the terms used, the statistics available and the goals achieved or missed. In acknowledging the degree to which language has become the prisoner of ideology, the issue is an attempt to return to basics: first the information, later the interpretation. Perhaps in answer to the question, “Are We Safer?” we should be asking, “Do We Feel Safer?” The answer is apparently no. It is hard to feel safer when we know at heart that we are proceeding along the lines of duplicity in our means of communicating and assessing our current status. The hope is that eventually more knowledge will yield more trust. When we trust that there are facts without spin, perhaps then we can make some conclusions. First the ground, then the sky. Details: New York: The Center on Law and Security at NYU School of Law, 2004. 52p. Source: Issue No. 3: Internet Resource: Accessed March 4, 2012 at http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Documents/Quarterly/fall04.pdf Year: 2004 Country: United States URL: http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Documents/Quarterly/fall04.pdf Shelf Number: 124375 Keywords: Homeland Security (U.S.)Patriot ActTerrorism |
Author: Burress, George W. Title: Homeland Security in Small Law Enforcement Jurisdictions: Preparedness, Efficacy, and Proximity to Big-City Peers Summary: Over the last decade, local law enforcement agencies have developed a more robust capacity to respond to homeland security incidents. This trend was initiated in response to the 9/11 terror attacks, though myriad other criminal events (shootings on college campuses) and non-criminal incidents (weather-related disasters) have contributed to this rallying cry. The main focus of the current discussion is on the need for agencies to develop an “all hazards” approach to homeland security that will increase prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery to a broad range of critical events, whether related to terrorism or not. Much of the dialog and attention has been focused on the largest agencies and metropolitan areas in the country, yet smaller jurisdictions also play a key role in developing and sustaining a homeland security network. It is the smallest agencies that are perhaps the least understood actors in the advances of the past decade. While training and funding opportunities have been extended to departments of all sizes, far less is known about the extent to which homeland security innovations have diffused into these small organizations, which represent the majority of all American law enforcement agencies. Prior work by this study’s authors in the state of Illinois suggests that smaller jurisdictions were not as prepared as their larger counterparts. This research suggested, but did not directly assess, the extent to which intragroup variation among small agencies was possibly a function of proximity. Were small agencies that were “closer” to large peers (in terms of physical distance and/or level of interaction) taking more preparatory measures and did they perceive they were more capable of an effective response to a homeland security event? The study described in this report sought to address these and related research questions. A stratified national sampling strategy was used to identify small municipal agencies (employing 25 or fewer full-time sworn officers) positioned across a variety of metropolitan and non-metropolitan contexts. Agency respondents (typically the chief executive officer) were asked to report a number of data points for their organization: assessments of the risk the jurisdiction would experience terrorist or non-terrorist homeland security incidents; preparedness measures taken by the agency; perceived efficacy of the agency’s response capacity across various salient domains (i.e., communication networks, policies, staffing, training, etc.); extent to which the responding agency monitors and emulates peers and best practices in the field; and, level of interactions between respondents and the nearest large municipal agency (employing 250+ full-time sworn officers). Project findings would tend to support organizational theory expectations regarding the diffusion of homeland security innovation. Agencies that perceived a greater risk of experiencing terrorism-related events reported greater levels of preparedness. Likewise, agencies that were more integrated into professional networks and paid more attention to respected peers and trends in the policing profession had engaged in more preparedness activities. Confirming the relevance of proximity to large agencies, respondents who engaged in more interactions with their closest large agency peer reported greater levels of preparedness. Agency size and position in more metropolitan areas also contributed to the level of reported preparedness. In addition, agencies that reported engaging in more preparatory measures perceived a greater level of efficacy should a homeland security incident occur. The results confirm that, while small agencies have been found less prepared in contrast to their larger peers, intragroup variation exists. While this variation is partially a function of the proximity between small jurisdictions and their larger peers, it also is influenced by the extent to which small agencies are connected to broader trends, practices, and peers within the profession. The results hold important implications for how future homeland security innovations might effectively be diffused into the smallest agencies in America’s policing system. This is a vital issue considering that over three-quarters of municipal agencies meet the definition of small used in this study. Details: Carbondale, IL: Dept. of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Southern Illinois University, 2012. 111p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed September 29, 2012 at: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/239466.pdf Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/239466.pdf Shelf Number: 126490 Keywords: Homeland Security (U.S.)Law Enforcement AgenciesTerrorism |
Author: U.S. Senate. Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Title: Federal Support for and Involvement in State and Local Fusion Centers Summary: Sharing terrorism-related information between state, local and Federal officials is crucial to protecting the United States from another terrorist attack. Achieving this objective was the motivation for Congress and the White House to invest hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars over the last nine years in support of dozens of state and local fusion centers across the United States. The Subcommittee investigation found that DHS-assigned detailees to the fusion centers forwarded “intelligence” of uneven quality – oftentimes shoddy, rarely timely, sometimes endangering citizens’ civil liberties and Privacy Act protections, occasionally taken from already-published public sources, and more often than not unrelated to terrorism. Congress directed the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to lead this initiative. A bipartisan investigation by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations has found, however, that DHS’s work with those state and local fusion centers has not produced useful intelligence to support Federal counterterrorism efforts. The Subcommittee investigation also found that DHS officials’ public claims about fusion centers were not always accurate. For instance, DHS officials asserted that some fusion centers existed when they did not. At times, DHS officials overstated fusion centers’ “success stories.” At other times, DHS officials failed to disclose or acknowledge non-public evaluations highlighting a host of problems at fusion centers and in DHS’s own operations. Since 2003, over 70 state and local fusion centers, supported in part with Federal funds, have been created or expanded in part to strengthen U.S. intelligence capabilities, particularly to detect, disrupt, and respond to domestic terrorist activities. DHS’s support for and involvement with these state and local fusion centers has, from the beginning, centered on their professed ability to strengthen Federal counterterrorism efforts. Under the leadership of Senator Coburn, Ranking Subcommittee Member, the Subcommittee has spent two years examining Federal support of fusion centers and evaluating the resulting counterterrorism intelligence. The Subcommittee’s investigative efforts included interviewing dozens of current and former Federal, state and local officials, reviewing more than a year’s worth of intelligence reporting from centers, conducting a nationwide survey of fusion centers, and examining thousands of pages of financial records and grant documentation. The investigation identified problems with nearly every significant aspect of DHS’s involvement with fusion centers. The Subcommittee investigation also determined that senior DHS officials were aware of the problems hampering effective counterterrorism work by the fusion centers, but did not always inform Congress of the issues, nor ensure the problems were fixed in a timely manner. Regarding the centers themselves, the Subcommittee investigation learned that a 2010 assessment of state and local fusion centers conducted at the request of DHS found widespread deficiencies in the centers’ basic counterterrorism information-sharing capabilities. DHS did not share that report with Congress or discuss its findings publicly. When the Subcommittee requested the assessment as part of its investigation, DHS at first denied it existed, then disputed whether it could be shared with Congress, before ultimately providing a copy. In 2011, DHS conducted its own, less rigorous assessment of fusion centers. While its resulting findings were more positive, they too indicated ongoing weaknesses at the fusion centers. The findings of both the 2010 and 2011 assessments contradict public statements by DHS officials who have described fusion centers as “one of the centerpieces of our counterterrorism strategy,”2 and “a major force multiplier in the counterterrorism enterprise.”3 Despite reviewing 13 months’ worth of reporting originating from fusion centers from April 1, 2009 to April 30, 2010, the Subcommittee investigation could identify no reporting which uncovered a terrorist threat, nor could it identify a contribution such fusion center reporting made to disrupt an active terrorist plot. Instead, the investigation found: The Subcommittee investigation found that the fusion centers often produced irrelevant, useless or inappropriate intelligence reporting to DHS, and many produced no intelligence reporting whatsoever. • Nearly a third of all reports – 188 out of 610 – were never published for use within DHS and by other members of the intelligence community, often because they lacked any useful information, or potentially violated Department guidelines meant to protect Americans’ civil liberties or Privacy Act protections. • In 2009, DHS instituted a lengthy privacy and civil liberties review process which kept most of the troubling reports from being released outside of DHS; however, it also slowed reporting down by months, and DHS continued to store troubling intelligence reports from fusion centers on U.S. persons, possibly in violation of the Privacy Act. • During the period reviewed, DHS intelligence reporting suffered from a significant backlog. At some points, hundreds of draft intelligence reports sat for months before DHS officials made a decision about whether to release them to the intelligence community. DHS published many reports so late – typically months late, but sometimes nearly a year after they were filed – that many were considered “obsolete” by the time they were released. • Most reporting was not about terrorists or possible terrorist plots, but about criminal activity, largely arrest reports pertaining to drug, cash or human smuggling. • Some terrorism-related “intelligence” reporting was based on older news releases or media accounts. • Some terrorism-related reporting also appeared to be a slower-moving duplicate of information shared with the National Counter Terrorism Center through a much quicker process run by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Screening Center. In interviews, current and former DHS officials involved in the fusion center reporting process stated they were aware that “a lot of [the reporting] was predominantly useless information,” as one DHS official put it.4 A former reporting branch chief said that while he was sometimes proud of the intelligence his unit produced, “There were times when it was, ‘what a bunch of crap is coming through.’”5 The Subcommittee investigation also examined DHS’s management of the fusion center counterterrorism intelligence reporting process. The investigation discovered: • DHS required only a week of training for intelligence officials before sending them to state and local fusion centers to report sensitive domestic intelligence, largely concerning U.S. persons. • Officials who routinely authored useless or potentially illegal fusion center intelligence reports faced no sanction or reprimand. The Subcommittee investigation also reviewed how the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), a component of DHS, distributed hundreds of millions of taxpayer dollars to support state and local fusion centers. DHS revealed that it was unable to provide an accurate tally of how much it had granted to states and cities to support fusion centers efforts, instead producing broad estimates of the total amount of Federal dollars spent on fusion center activities from 2003 to 2011, estimates which ranged from $289 million to $1.4 billion. The Subcommittee investigation also found that DHS failed to adequately police how states and municipalities used the money intended for fusion centers. The investigation found that DHS did not know with any accuracy how much grant money it has spent on specific fusion centers, nor could it say how most of those grant funds were spent, nor has it examined the effectiveness of those grant dollars. The Subcommittee conducted a more detailed case study review of expenditures of DHS grant funds at five fusion centers, all of which lacked basic, “must-have” intelligence capabilities, according to assessments conducted by and for DHS. The Subcommittee investigation found that the state and local agencies used some of the Federal grant money to purchase: • dozens of flat-screen TVs; • Sport Utility Vehicles they then gave away to other local agencies; and • hidden “shirt button” cameras, cell phone tracking devices, and other surveillance equipment unrelated to the analytical mission of a fusion center. All of those expenditures were allowed under FEMA’s rules and guidance, DHS officials told the Subcommittee. Yet none of them appeared to have addressed the deficiencies in the centers’ basic information analysis and sharing capabilities, so they could better contribute to Federal counterterrorism efforts. Every day, tens of thousands of DHS employees go to work dedicated to keeping America safe from terrorism; Federal funding of fusion centers was intended to advance that Federal objective. Fusion centers may provide valuable services in fields other than terrorism, such as contributions to traditional criminal investigations, public safety, or disaster response and recovery efforts. In this investigation, the Subcommittee confined its work to examining the Federal return on its extensive support of state and local fusion centers, using the counterterrorism objectives established by law, Executive strategy, and DHS policy statements and assessments. The investigation found that top DHS officials consistently made positive public comments about the value and importance of fusion centers’ contributions to Federal counterterrorism efforts, even as internal reviews and non-public assessments highlighted problems at the centers and dysfunction in DHS’s own operations. But DHS and the centers do not shoulder sole responsibility for the fusion centers’ counterterrorism intelligence failures. Congress has played a role, as well. Since Congress created DHS in 2003, dozens of committees and subcommittees in both Houses have claimed jurisdiction over various aspects of the Department. DHS officials annually participate in hundreds of hearings, briefings, and site visits for Members of Congress and their staffs. At Congress’ request, the Department annually produces thousands of pages of updates, assessments and other reports. Yet amid all the Congressional oversight, some of the worst problems plaguing the Department’s fusion center efforts have gone largely undisclosed and unexamined. At its conclusion, this Report offers several recommendations to clarify DHS’s role with respect to state and local fusion centers. The Report recommends that Congress and DHS revisit the statutory basis for DHS support of fusion centers, in light of the investigation’s findings. It also recommends that DHS improve its oversight of Federal grant funds supporting fusion centers; conduct promised assessments of fusion center information-sharing; and strengthen its protection of civil liberties in fusion center intelligence reporting. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2012. 141p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed October 5, 2012 at: www.hsgac.senate.gov Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: Shelf Number: 126564 Keywords: Counter-TerrorismFusion CentersHomeland Security (U.S.)Intelligence GatheringTerrorism |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Countering Violent Extremism: Additional Actions Could Strengthen Training Efforts Summary: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified and is communicating to its components and state and local partners topics that the training on countering violent extremism (CVE) it provides or funds should cover; in contrast, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has not identified what topics should be covered in its CVE-related training. According to a DHS official who leads DHS's CVE efforts, identifying topics has helped to provide a logical structure for DHS's CVE-related training efforts. According to DOJ officials, even though they have not specifically identified what topics should be covered in CVE-related training, they understand internally which of the department's training is CVE-related and contributes either directly or indirectly to the department's training responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. However, over the course of this review, the department generally relied upon the framework GAO developed for potential CVE-related training topics to determine which of its existing training was CVE-related. Further, because DOJ has not identified CVE-related training topics, DOJ components have had challenges in determining the extent to which their training efforts contribute to DOJ's responsibilities under the CVE national strategy. In addition, officials who participated in an interagency working group focusing on ensuring CVE-related training quality stated that the group found it challenging to catalogue federal CVE-related training because agencies' views differed as to what CVE-related training includes. The majority of state and local participant feedback on training that DHS or DOJ provided or funded and that GAO identified as CVE-related was positive or neutral, but a minority of participants raised concerns about biased, inaccurate, or offensive material. DHS and DOJ collected feedback from 8,424 state and local participants in CVE-related training during fiscal years 2010 and 2011, and 77--less than 1 percent--provided comments that expressed such concerns. According to DHS and DOJ officials, agencies used the feedback to make changes where appropriate. DOJ's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and other components generally solicit feedback for more formal, curriculum-based training, but the FBI does not require this for activities such as presentations by guest speakers because the FBI does not consider this to be training. Similarly, DOJ's United States Attorneys' Offices (USAO) do not require feedback on presentations and similar efforts. Nevertheless, FBI field offices and USAOs covered about 39 percent (approximately 9,900) of all participants in DOJ CVE-related training during fiscal years 2010 and 2011 through these less formal methods, yet only 4 of 21 FBI field offices and 15 of 39 USAOs chose to solicit feedback on such methods. GAO has previously reported that agencies need to develop systematic evaluation processes in order to obtain accurate information about the benefits of their training. Soliciting feedback for less formal efforts on a more consistent basis could help these agencies ensure their quality. DOJ and DHS have undertaken reviews and developed guidance to help improve the quality of CVE-related training. For example, in September 2011, the DOJ Deputy Attorney General directed all DOJ components and USAOs to review all of their training materials, including those related to CVE, to ensure they are consistent with DOJ standards. In addition, in October 2011, DHS issued guidance that covers best practices for CVE-related training and informs recipients of DHS grants who use the funding for training involving CVE on how to ensure high-quality training. Since the departments' reviews and efforts to implement the guidance they have developed are relatively new, it is too soon to determine their effectiveness. Why GAO Did This Study DHS and DOJ have responsibility for training state and local law enforcement and community members on how to defend against violent extremism--ideologically motivated violence to further political goals. Community members and advocacy organizations have raised concerns about the quality of some CVE-related training that DOJ and DHS provide or fund. As requested, GAO examined (1)the extent to which DHS and DOJ have identified and communicated topics that CVE-related training should address to their components and state and local partners, (2) any concerns raised by state and local partners who have participated in CVE-related training provided or funded by DHS or DOJ, and (3) actions DHS and DOJ have taken to improve the quality of CVE-related training. GAO reviewed relevant documents, such as training participant feedback forms and DHS and DOJ guidance; and interviewed relevant officials from DHS and DOJ components. This is a public version of a sensitive report that GAO issued in September 2012. Information that the FBI deemed sensitive has been redacted. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that DOJ identify and communicate principal CVE-related training topics and that FBI field offices and USAOs consider soliciting feedback more consistently. DOJ agreed that it should more consistently solicit feedback, but disagreed that it should identify CVE training topics because DOJ does not have primary responsibility for CVE-related training, among other things. GAO believes this recommendation remains valid as discussed further in this report. Details: Wshington, DC: GAO, 2012. 70p. Source: Internet Resource: GAO-13-79: Accessed November 20, 2012 at: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-79 Year: 2012 Country: United States URL: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-13-79 Shelf Number: 126940 Keywords: Counter-Terrorism TrainingExtremist GroupHomeland Security (U.S.)Police TrainingTerrorismTerroristsViolent Extremism |
Author: Ackerman, Gary Title: The “New” Face of Transnational Crime Organizations (TCOs): A Geopolitical Perspective and Implications to U.S. National Security Summary: The continually evolving strategic environment coupled with the ascendant role of Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) necessitates a comprehensive understanding of these organizations. TCOs represent a globally-networked national security threat and pose a real and present risk to the safety and security of Americans and our partners across the globe. This challenge blurs the line among US institutions and far surpasses the ability of any one agency or nation to confront it. Thus countering TCOs necessitates a whole-of-government approach and beyond that vibrant relationships with partner nations based on trust. These are essential if the U.S. is to remain the partner of choice, and effectively counter TCOs globally. Weak and unstable government institutions coupled with scarce legitimate economic opportunities, extreme socio-economic inequities, and permissive corrupt environments are key enablers that allow TCOs to operate with impunity. These same factors enable the emergence of VEOs. The potential nexus between VEOs and TCOs remains an area of deep concern. In this context, deeper insight into the contemporary face of TCO's will facilitate the development of strategies to counter and defeat them. In this struggle, DoD lacks law enforcement authorities but brings to the government some unique capabilities. This white volume examines the “new” face of these transnational crime organizations and provides a geopolitical perspective and implications to U.S. national security. The nexus of culture and technology (including modern communication technologies) and their impact on the evolution of TCOs is discussed in addition to their implications to countering TCOs. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff and Department of Defense, 2013. 206p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 6, 2013 at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=733208 Year: 2013 Country: United States URL: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=733208 Shelf Number: 128311 Keywords: Criminal NetworksHomeland Security (U.S.)Organized CrimeTransnational Crime |
Author: U.S. Immigration and CustomsEnforcement Title: Secure Communities: A Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens. Strategic Plan Summary: Secure Communities: A Comprehensive Plan to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens (Secure Communities) is working with ICE senior leadership and offices, as well as the broader law enforcement community, to better identify criminal aliens, prioritize enforcement actions on those posing the greatest threat to public safety, and transform the entire criminal alien enforcement process. Through improved technology, continual data analysis, and timely information sharing with a broad range of law enforcement agency (LEA) partners, we are helping to protect communities across the country. This document outlines our goals, objectives, and our strategic approach to accomplishing them. Details: Wshington, DC: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 2009. 28p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 9, 2013 at: http://epic.org/privacy/secure_communities/securecommunitiesstrategicplan09.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: http://epic.org/privacy/secure_communities/securecommunitiesstrategicplan09.pdf Shelf Number: 128336 Keywords: Border PatrolBorder SecurityCriminal AliensCustoms EnforcementHomeland Security (U.S.)Illegal MigrantsImmigration Enforcement |